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HOBBISM IN THE LATER 1660s: DANIEL 
SCARGILL AND SAMUEL PARKER 
JON PARKIN 
Selwyn College, Cambridge 
ABSTRACT. Daniel Scargill and Samuel Parker have both been regarded as isolated and eccentric 
disciples of Thomas Hobbes. However, a detailed examination of their views reveals a more 
complicated relationship with the notorious philosopher. Farfrom being simple 'Hobbists', Scargill 
and Parker developed ideas close to those of 'latitudinarian' clergymen. In the polarizing political 
circumstances of the later i66os, the hostile identification of their views with the doctrines of the 
Leviathan led to public discussion of latitudinarianism and its relationship to Hobbism. In response, 
writers with latitudinarian sympathies used criticism of Hobbes as a means of reconsidering and 
redefining their own position. Such criticism accepted some of Hobbes's political conclusions, while at 
the same time rejecting his controversial methodology. Discussion of Hobbism and criticism of Hobbes 
were thus important means by which Hobbes's political insights were absorbed by Restoration political 
thinkers. 
Thomas Hobbes was easily the most notorious philosopher in seventeenth- 
century England. He may have had, as he frequently claimed, admirers and 
followers on the continent, but in England his work appears at first sight to 
have fallen on stonier ground. The critical response to his masterpiece, the 
Leviathan, seemed to be uniformly hostile. Almost every year after its publication 
in i651, books, pamphlets, sermons, and plays rolled off the presses containing 
serious objections to his work.' 
It would be possible to suggest that the response was so violent because 
Hobbes's ideas went far beyond anything which his readers had come across 
before. To his adversaries, Hobbes had built his commonwealth on self-interest 
and against a brutal state of war - a condition so awful that it required the 
establishment of an absolute civil power to maintain the peace. This overriding 
concern with stability made it necessary for his sovereign to become not only 
the interpreter and arbiter of natural law, but even of scripture itself. Such 
doctrine, uncompromisingly packaged in a provocative prose style, shocked 
1 For Hobbes's claims about his continental following see Quentin Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes 
and his disciples in France and England', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (I996), 
pp. I 53-67. The classic account of the reception of Hobbes's works is Samuel Mintz's The hunting 
of Leviathan: seventeenth-century reactions to the materialism and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes 
(Cambridge, i969), but see also John Bowle, Hobbes and his critics: a study in seventeenth-century 
constitutionalism (London, I 95 I). For the most recent account, see Mark Goldie, 'The reception of 
Hobbes', in J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie, eds., The Cambridge history of political thought, I450-I700 
(Cambridge, I99I), pp. 589-6I5. 
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many.2 Hobbes's name became the shorthand for atheism, libertinism, 
materialism, and selfish behaviour - his writings were a constant reminder of 
the forces of darkness unleashed during the Interregnum. 
Increasingly, however, we have come to recognize that the suggestion that 
Hobbes's ideas faced unqualified rejection may not tell the whole story.3 
Hobbes's insights could be accepted and developed, even by his critics. 
Furthermore, there were individuals in the Restoration period who did seem to 
be upholding distinctively Hobbesian positions. It is tempting to view such 
examples as aberrations, and, indeed, the immediate (usually hysterical) 
response of contemporaries might encourage such a view. But this would be to 
ignore the reasons why such Hobbism was expressed. As Sterling Lamprecht 
emphasized long ago, the ideas of Hobbes and those of' Hobbists' could often 
be very different things.4 In what follows I shall re-examine the cases of two 
supposed followers of Hobbes in order to show that their particular brands of 
'Hobbism' were closely related to distinctive Restoration contexts, contexts 
which not only tell us something about the reception of Hobbes, but also the 
ways in which discussion of the specific problem of ' Hobbism' could take on a 
wider significance in the political thought and practice of the period. 
I 
Perhaps the best place to start is with a confessed Hobbist. The tale of the 
recantation of Daniel Scargill, fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, is 
a story often told in illustration of the kind of backlash that unwisely expressed 
Hobbesian views might face.5 It is also a story that portrays Scargill as a lone 
eccentric, a debauched youth who suddenly, and inexplicably, developed a 
taste for Hobbesian ideas. This is to accept the testimony of his accusers 
uncritically. It is also a view which neglects the extent to which Scargill's 
appreciation of Hobbes grew out of a distinctive Restoration background, and 
it is this that I would like to explore in re-telling his story. This begins not with 
Scargill, but rather with his college, Corpus Christi. 
In the i66os Corpus Christi, or Bene't College as it was more commonly 
known, was one of the more politically moderate establishments in an extremely 
reactionary Restoration Cambridge. Corpus had been preserved from civil 
2 On Hobbes's use of provocative rhetoric, see particular Quentin Skinner, Reason and rhetoric in 
the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, I 996). 
3 See particularly John Marshall 'The ecclesiology of the latitude-men, i660-I689: 
Stillingfleet, Tillotson and "Hobbism"', journal of Ecclesiastical History, 26 (I985), pp. 407-27. 
4 S. P. Lamprecht, 'Hobbes and Hobbism', American Political Science Review, 34 (I940), 
pp. 3I-53. 
5 The Scargill affair has been discussed in detail by C. L. S. Linnel, 'Daniel Scargill, a penitent 
Hobbist', Church Quarterly Review, I56 (I 953), pp. 256-65. A much more substantial consideration 
of the manuscript sources is given in J. Axtell, 'The mechanics of opposition: Restoration 
Cambridge v. Daniel Scargill', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 38 (I965), pp. I02-I I. 
For briefer discussions see Mintz, Hunting of Leviathan, pp. 50-2; John Twigg, The university of 
Cambridge and the English Revolution (Woodbridge, I990), pp. 259-60. 
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war upheaval by its pragmatic master, Richard Love, who died in i66o.6 It 
is tempting to speculate that some of the inhabitants of the college may have 
come to the mind of the anonymous S. P., usually assumed to be Simon Patrick, 
when he wrote his famous Brief account of the new sect of latitude men, in I662. In 
that work, latitude-men were defined with relation to, among other things, 
their moderate conformism and interest in the new natural philosophy.7 If 
Richard Love had been a model ecclesiastical trimmer, Corpus also fostered a 
small pocket of scientific interest inspired by the highly symbolic presence of 
William Rawley, Francis Bacon's editor and former chaplain. 
One of Rawley's particular friends at Corpus was John Spencer, who 
produced a work in I 663 entitled A discourse concerning prodigies. A sober response 
to some of the more hysterical pamphlet productions of the early Restoration, 
Spencer's work stressed the importance of a rational, Baconian solution to 
dangerous popular superstition.8 The laws of matter and motion, Spencer 
claimed, could be deployed to debunk astrology, and to drive fraudulent 
fortune-tellers out of business. He was especially eloquent on the role of such 
philosophy in overcoming atheism as well: 'This will secure us', he wrote, 'as 
from the rocks of Atheism because leading us to the notice of some First Cause, 
into which all the second doe gradually ascend and finally resolve; so also from 
the shelves of superstition, because acquainting us with the second causes.'9 
There was, however, a double-edge to the new science which Spencer could not 
ignore. Although he was quite optimistic about the therapeutic power of 
natural philosophy in general, he also acknowledged that this very belief could 
sometimes lead to atheism. Curing superstition might cause an unhealthy 
fixation on secondary causes, something which might encourage infidelity: 'we 
shall not seldom find men ... advancing the length of their own understanding 
and experience ... the common standard and measure of the truth or falsehood 
of things'. Spencer leaves the identity of such closet atheists for his readers to 
guess, but it is likely that Spencer was disturbed most of all by the shadow of 
Thomas Hobbes, whose systematic materialism had led to a very questionable 
faith.'0 Spencer may have written a work against fortune-telling, but he could 
not have foretold better the very dilemma that he would have to resolve as 
6 R. Masters, The history of the college ofCorpusChristiandtheBlessed Virgin Mary (Cambridge, I753), 
p. I5I- 
7 Throughout this paper I shall use the term 'latitudinarian' to denote individuals with these 
particular qualities in mind. Although John Spurr has quite rightly attacked the idea of 
latitudinarianism as an organized movement in the Church of England, the term can, I believe, be 
used more loosely to describe those conforming Anglicans who did have an interest in stoic and 
scholastic naturalism. For a further discussion of this tradition see J. Parkin, Science, religion and 
politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland's De legibus naturae (Woodbridge, forthcoming), 
chs. 2, 5. ForJohn Spurr's attack on the concept of latitudinarianism see "'Latitudinarianism" 
and the Restoration church', Historical Journal, 3I (I988), pp. 6 I-82. 
8 Spencer's work was specifically responding to Mirabilis annus or theyear of prodigies and wonders, 
being afaithfull and impartial collection of several signs that hath been seen in the heavens, in the earth, and in 
the waters (London, I66o). 
9 John Spencer, A discourse concerning prodigies (London, I663), p. 76. 10 Ibid., p. 57. 
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master of Corpus just five years later when he would confront the college's very 
own Hobbist. 
Daniel Scargill, of Cambridgeshire, was admitted to Corpus in January 
I662, at the age of fifteen." He soon came under the guidance of one of the 
college's rising stars, the twenty-seven year-old, newly elected Norwich fellow, 
Thomas Tenison. A close friend of John Spencer, and son-in-law of Richard 
Love, Tenison shared the former's enthusiasm for the new science, having also 
trained as a physician in the i650s.'2 Scargill clearly flourished under his 
tutor's supervision, winning the Manners Scholarship in I666. The following 
year saw the death of the master of Corpus, Francis Wilford. John Spencer was 
unanimously elected in his place in August I667; the man chosen to succeed to 
Spencer's own fellowship was the twenty year-old Scargill. 
The accounts of what happened next are mainly taken from later, and 
largely hostile, testimony against Scargill, but the evidence does allow us to 
construct a rough chronology. The college chapter book shows that Scargill's 
specialities, for teaching at least, were Greek and rhetoric.'3 It was clear, 
however, that his academic tastes extended beyond this. In the autumn of I668, 
during a routine exercise in the Bachelor Schools, Scargill defended the thesis 
that the origin of the world could be explained mechanically.'4 Now although 
this has been taken as evidence of Scargill's allegiance to Hobbes, it is worth 
noting that such a position, although clearly provocative, did have some basis 
in the modern natural philosophy that Spencer and Tenison, his patrons, had 
been so keen to promote. The mechanical hypothesis itself was a central theme 
of Cartesian and, perhaps more importantly, Gassendi's neo-Epicurean natural 
philosophy. Neo-Epicureanism had enjoyed a considerable vogue in England 
since the I650s, whenJohn Evelyn had translated the first book of Lucretius's 
De rerum natura. Walter Charleton had provided a popular and detailed 
account of Gassendi's natural philosophy in his Physiologia of I654. These works 
effectively baptized Epicurus's randomly colliding atoms, but kept his 
characteristic appeal to mechanistic theory, in juxtaposition with a distant and 
inscrutable deity. This made it doubly appealing to English writers, including 
Robert Boyle, for whom such hypotheses were consistent with a deeply 
nominalist theology.'5 An empirical and probabilistic science accorded much 
" Scargill matriculated as a 'sizar', a class of student who received 'sizes', or buttery expenses, 
in return for domestic services rendered to the wealthier students. This system allowed poorer 
students to work their way through their degrees. J. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses (4 vols., 
Cambridge, I927), IV, p. 28. 
12 Tenison would go on to correspond with the Royal Society. For Tenison's medical training 
see W. Hutton's entry for Tenison in the Dictionary of national biography (London, I 898), LVI, p. 57. 
For Tenison's contacts with the Royal Society, see The correspondence of Henry Oldenburg, ed. A. 
Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall (I I vols., Madison, I965-77), VII, pp. 494-5; VIII, pp. 348, 430. 
13 Corpus Christi College Chapter Book, i66os. 
14 Henry Gostling, another Corpus fellow, and his opponent in this instance, testified that 
Scargill had openly asserted that Origo mundi potest explicari mechanice. Lambeth Palace MS 94I, 
fo. I o8. 
15 For Charleton, see M. J. Osler, 'Descartes and Walter Charleton on nature and God', 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 40 (I 979), pp. 445-56; For Boyle's opinion of Gassendi see R. Kargon, 
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better with the idea of an omnipotent but incomprehensible God than the more 
anthropomorphically presumptive Cartesianism.16 Scargill's tutors, as we have 
seen, were keen to promote modern natural philosophy. Epicureanism, above 
all, was one rationalist answer to the superstition against which Spencer had 
been campaigning in the early i66os. It is not hard to see how the strident 
rationalism encouraged by Spencer and Tenison might have had an effect 
upon some of their favoured students. In addition, the adversarial disputations 
in the Schools encouraged the precocious to discuss controversial topics, a 
feature of academic life which often allowed the airing of unusual theses.'7 
With this possibly experimental Epicurean enthusiasm in mind, we can now 
turn to Scargill's other noteworthy thesis of i 668, defended in the same 
disputation, which was to uphold that the system of the universe does not prove 
the existence of God. Clearly this invited controversy, but two points need to be 
made against this being a distinctively Hobbesian thesis. First, Hobbes had 
never made such a statement, and secondly, the proposition could still be 
discussed within a neo-Epicurean framework, without necessarily admitting to 
a straightforward atheism. Epicureans argued that although empirical in- 
formation could provide a probabilistic structure in which to analyse the 
universe for our own purposes, it could tell us nothing about the nature of the 
gods. In its baptized form, such a thesis might appeal to deeply nominalist 
thinkers, for whom God was fundamentally beyond human understanding."8 
That said, neo-Epicureanism, and, indeed, any forms of the new natural 
philosophy, were still extremely contentious topics in Cambridge.'9 It soon 
became clear that Scargill was taking these ideas in directions which were 
becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. This impression is strengthened by 
'Robert Boyle and the acceptance of Epicurean atomism in England', Isis, 45 (i 964), PP. I 84-92; 
J. J. MacIntosh, 'Robert Boyle on Epicurean atheism and atomism', in M. Osler, eds., Atoms, 
pneuma and tranquility (Cambridge, I99I), pp. I97-220; idem, 'The intellectual sources of Robert 
Boyle's philosophy of nature: Gassendi's voluntarism, and Boyle's physico-theological project', in 
R. Kroll, R. Ashcraft, and P. Zagorin, eds., Philosophy, science and religion in England, I640-I700 
(Cambridge, I992), Pp. I78-98. For Epicureanism in England more generally see T. F. Mayo, 
Epicurus in England, I650-I725 (Dallas, I934); R. F. Kroll, The material word: literate culture in the 
Restoration and early eighteenth century (Baltimore, i99i). 
16 For this critical response to Cartesianism, see Parkin, Science, religion and politics in Restoration 
England, ch. 5. 
17 On this aspect of the disputation see M. Feingold, The mathematicians' apprenticeship: science, 
universities and society in England, I560-I640 (Cambridge, I984), PP. I03-4; A. C. Kors, Atheism in 
France, I650-I729 (Princeton, I990), pp. 84-5, 90-I, 285-7, 293. 
18 Walter Charleton, The darkness of atheism dispelled by the light of nature (London I652), P. I25. 
It is also worth noting that such a position is not all that far removed from Spencer's desire to 
prevent people speculating about God's intentions on the basis of natural phenomena. Cf. Spencer, 
A discourse concerning vulgar prophecies (London, I665), P. I 3 I . 
19 In November i668, Edmund Boldero, vice-chancellor of the university, passed a decree 
forbidding undergraduates and bachelors of arts from basing their disputations on Cartesian work. 
For the reception of the new philosophy in Cambridge during this period, see John Gascoigne, 
Cambridge in the age of the Enlightenment: science, religion and politics from the Restoration to the French 
Revolution (Cambridge, I 989), P. 56. For Boldero's decree see Bodleian Library, Oxford, Rawlinson 
MS C.I46, fo. 35. 
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Tenison's recollection that in a meeting with his former student some time in 
i668, Scargill had asserted his belief in the material nature of the soul, saying 
that he thought that 'the soul of man is but a trembling atome'.20 This was 
much more controversial, and although reportedly said in private, it was 
something which even conventional neo-Epicurean writers shied away from 
endorsing.2' Whatever the origin of his views, Scargill's extra-curricular 
interests were certainly moving him away from the cosy Baconian consensus 
which had filled John Spencer with so much optimism. In fact, Scargill, from 
being one of Spencer's brightest proteges, was turning into his worst nightmare. 
The college's initial reaction was to try and keep Scargill's exotic opinions 
out of the public sphere. Private opinions and conversation were one thing, but 
the public airing of such views was becoming too dangerous.22 Friendly advice, 
and even threats from colleagues, led Scargill to withdraw from another 
disputation in I668, and he had made 'severall Solemne potestations and 
promises never to be guilty in the like nature againe'.23 Scargill did not keep his 
promise. Appearing in the Schools, he proposed to defend the thesis that moral 
justice is founded in positive civil law, and that good and evil were not eternal 
categories. This appeared to be a reference to Hobbesian relativism, a suspicion 
confirmed when just before the disputation where he argued these theses, 
Scargill sent a note back to his college asking if one of the fellows would be 
' pleased to send me Ward's pretence against Hobbes'. The book he was asking 
for was Seth Ward's comprehensive Latin critique of Hobbes, the Exercitatio 
epistolica (i656). 24 Scargill's flirtation with Hobbesian ideas was consistent with 
20 Axtell takes this as evidence that some of the arguments used by Scargill could have come 
from Tenison in the course of regular teaching. Although this is possible, in this instance Tenison's 
testimony is from a visit which he made to Corpus from his living near Huntingdon, in I668. It is 
possible that such a visit might have been undertaken at Spencer's request, in order to try and wean 
Scargill off Epicureanism. Axtell, 'The mechanics of opposition', p. I09 n. 2; cf. Lambeth MS 94I, 
fo. Io8, section 3. 
21 Although similar ideas could be found in Lucretius' De rerum natura. Materialist ideas had also 
been used during the I640s by radical writers such as Richard Overton, particularly in his Man's 
mortalitie; or, a treatise wherein 'tis proved both theologically andphylosophically, that whole man, as a rationall 
creature, is a compound wholly mortall, contrary to that common distinction of soule and body (London, I 644). 
22 This supports Michael Hunter's suggestion that we should reconsider the degree to which 
public and published sentiments reflect the full extent of heterodox discussion, particularly as the 
Scargill affair reveals the existence of such discussion in private conversation. M. Hunter, 'The 
witchcraft controversy and the nature of free thought in Restoration England: John Wagstaffe's 
The question of witchcraft debated (I669)' and idem, "'Aikenhead the Atheist": the context and 
consequences of articulate irreligion in the late seventeenth century', in M. Hunter, Science and the 
shape of orthodoxy: intellectual change in late seventeenth-century B itain (Woodbridge, I 995), pp. 286-307, 
308-32. 23 Lambeth MS 94I, fo. Io8, section 5. 
24 Ibid., section 6. This evidence is usually taken to indicate that Scargill was taking his Hobbes 
from books like Ward's. There is, however, no reason to suppose that Hobbes's work was 
unavailable to Scargill. Thomas Tenison, his tutor, carefully quoted a whole range of Hobbesian 
works in constructing The creed of Mr Hobbes examin'd (London, I670). Scargill's comment shows 
that he was familiar enough with the material to have formed ajudgement about Ward's book. It 
is surely better to say that he was consulting the work in order to prepare for a disputation in which 
he would inevitably have to face Ward's well-known critique. 
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his neo-Epicurean leanings. There were clear links between a neo-Epicurean 
adaptation of nominalist philosophy and the kind of project which Hobbes had 
undertaken. Both sought to attack superstition and mysticism by providing a 
rational scientia amenable to human understanding. Both projects were founded 
upon a nominalist interpretation of the distant relationship between God and 
the Creation; both had provided moral philosophies which stressed the 
necessity of coming to terms with an unstable moral universe. Hobbes was a 
great friend of Gassendi, and his closest friends and admirers in England were 
Epicurean writers such as Charleton, who openly praised him in print.25 The 
use of Hobbesian ideas in a public context, though, however consistent with 
Scargill's other apparent beliefs, pushed things one step too far. 
In the first week of December i668, Scargill was hauled in front of the 
university consistory court to explain himself.26 In an interview with Peter 
Gunning, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, he made it clear that his use of 
Hobbesian material was not uncritical. Gunning brought up the discrepancy 
between some of the offending theses and Hobbes's own positions, but Scargill, 
perhaps to Gunning's surprise, declared that 'in such places Mr Hobbs 
canted'. This retort has been taken to indicate that Scargill had got his Hobbes 
imperfectly from another source, but it is also clear that another interpretation 
could be that Scargill was using Hobbesian arguments within a neo-Epicurean 
framework which was similar but not identical. Scargill could pick and choose 
his Hobbes without being an unquestioning follower. The court, which 
included John Spencer, demanded that Scargill make a public recantation in 
the Bachelor Schools, which it would appear that he did. He was suspended 
from his duties until the following June.27 
25 If Charleton could refer to Hobbes as that 'Noble Enquirer into Truth' who had published 
that 'inestimable manual of humane nature' in I650, it was an opinion which he kept into the 
I670s, when, as a fellow of the Royal Society, he could refer to 'our Incomparable Mr Hobs.' 
Charleton, Delirameta catarrhi (London, I650), sig. AIv; Concerning the different wits of men (London, 
I669), Preface. For Charleton's many references to Hobbes see C. D. Thorpe, The aesthetic theory of 
Thomas Hobbes (Michigan, I 940), PP. I 76-88. 
26 The court consisted of the following heads of houses: Edmund Boldero (Jesus), James 
Fleetwood (King's), Richard Minshull (Sidney Sussex), Peter Gunning (St John's), Theophilus 
Dillingham (Clare Hall), John Spencer (Corpus), Robert King (Trinity Hall), Robert Brady 
(Gonville and Caius), John Pearson (Trinity). The ideological composition of the court in many 
ways represented the strength of high-churchmen restored to university office by royal mandate 
after the Restoration. In some cases this had been at the calculated expense of latitudinarian 
incumbents, as in Fleetwood's replacement of Benjamin Whichcote, and Gunning's ejection of 
John Tillotson from his Clare Hall fellowship. For information on heads of house during the 
Restoration, see Twigg, The university of Cambridge and the English Revolution, p. 239. 
27 It is worth noting that this penalty was in line with the abortive bill against atheism which 
had been introduced in i666. It was sent up into the Lords in October I667 with the provision that 
first offenders should be fined and required to make public recantations before the court and in 
their parish church. Although the bill was never passed, it was probably with such deliberations in 
mind that the consistory court delivered their (perhaps surprisingly lenient) sentence. For details 
of the bill and its relationship to anti-Hobbesian feeling in the later i 66os, see P. Milton, 'Hobbes, 
heresy and Lord Arlington', History of Political Thought, I 4 (I 993), PP. 5 I 6-2 I. Scargill was lucky 
to escape so lightly; in the same year in Scotland, another enthusiast of the new science, Robert 
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If the university authorities had felt that this was a sufficient punishment, 
some of Scargill's colleagues at Corpus may have felt otherwise. The public 
exposure of Scargill's hitherto privately expressed views put the college, and 
particularly the master, in an awkward situation. Spencer had presided over an 
intellectually progressive institution, and Scargill's rise within it had ac- 
companied his own elevation to the master's lodge. The reputation of the 
master and the college were now compromised by their connection with a 
confessed Hobbist, a connection which the politically vulnerable Corpus 
latitudinarians could ill-afford. The situation was particularly embarrassing to 
John Spencer because his own fiercely rationalist work, which pushed at the 
boundaries of orthodoxy in its vehement denial of prophecy and divination, 
was at that moment about to take a decisive turn. Since the second edition of 
the Discourse in I665, Spencer's special interest in the mechanics of prophecy 
had dovetailed with his interest in Hebrew customs. This resulted in his 
Dissertatio de urim et thummim, due to be published in I669, a detailed study of 
Jewish methods of prophecy. What was striking about Spencer's thesis was his 
insistence that Jewish forms of divination, and the manner of their ma- 
nipulation by priests, were adapted from Egyptian ritual.28 to promote this 
kind of thesis, and to harbour a now publicly exposed Hobbist, may have been 
a potentially scandalous mix. For these reasons, Spencer may have decided 
that Scargill had to go. 
It is thus no surprise to find Spencer and some of the other fellows close to the 
master orchestrating what amounted to a smear campaign against the now 
suspended Scargill.29 The testimony of the fellows covering the period after his 
Hamilton, fell foul of the university authorities in Aberdeen for references to Hobbes in his 
Schediasmata libero-philosophica (Edinburgh, I 668). For Hamilton see C. Shepherd, 'Philosophy and 
science in the arts curriculum of the Scottish universities in the seventeenth century' (Ph.D. thesis, 
Edinburgh, I975), pp. I48, 200, 262-3, 307; The diary of Mr John Lamont of Newton, I649-7I, ed. 
J. R. Murdoch (Edinburgh, I830), pp. 207-8. 
28 This was a theme which Spencer would expand in his De legibus Hebraeorum (London, I 685), 
which systematically developed the highly controversial thesis that the Hebrew priesthood had 
encouraged superstition and idolatry on the model of the Egyptians. Another writer to be 
discussing the urim and thummim (a form of priestly divination mentioned cryptically in Exodus 
28.30) from an erastian and anti-clerical perspective was, of course, Thomas Hobbes, in chapter 
42 of Leviathan, where it was discussed in the context of illusory supports for papal power, and also 
(at the same time as Spencer) in the unpublished Behemoth. For discussion of Spencer's thesis see 
J. A. I. Champion, The pillars of priestcraft shaken: the Church of England and its enemies, i660-i730 
(Cambridge, I992), pp. I55-7. For Hobbes's references to urim and thummim, see The English works 
of Thomas Hobbes, ed. W. Molesworth (I I vols., London, I839-45), III, p. 557; VI, p. 279. 
29 Several names recur frequently in the testimony supplied as evidence against Scargill: 
William Briggs (I642-I704), Henry Gostling (I648-75), Richard Sheldrake (I638-I720), and 
Erasmus Lane (i640-I7I5). Briggs was another of Tenison's students whose election to the 
fellowship had been opposed by Scargill. Gostling was Scargill's opponent in the November 
disputation. Sheldrake and Lane were more senior fellows. Lane clearly had a talent for this kind 
of work; in the autumn of I 669 he organized similar material in another petition, this time designed 
to exclude the memorably named Wormley Martin, ofJesus College, from a Corpus fellowship on 
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first suspension descends to the level of scurrilous gossip and innuendo about his 
private life: Scargill was accused of association with the 'younger scholars of 
the college, townsmen of inferior quallity', or, even worse, 'young women'. He 
was reported to begin his day 'with a pint of sack, or some other strong liquor, 
often to drink to distemper and then us'd to shew himself openly to the just 
scandall of the Society'. he was said to keep gaming tables in his rooms, with 
which he would play at dice with the younger students. Perhaps the best story 
tells of Scargill's disastrous trip to the seaside at King's Lynn in the spring of 
I 669, on what was described as a 'frolick'. Scargill, together with some Corpus 
students, was allegedly, 'several times disorder'd with wine and strong waters 
and moreover there did quarrell with one of his company and caus'd by it a 
tumultuous concourse of people in the public streets and the drawing of one or 
more swords in that quarrell'. Now it is clear that Scargill was hardly a model 
citizen, but much of this, far from being habitual (and more importantly 
unrelated to his philosophical positions), seems to have been the unfortunate, 
but hardly surprising, result of his suspension. Such accounts of Scargill's 
recreational activities, however, gave Spencer the evidence he needed to get rid 
of Scargill for good, and on 12 March I669, the consistory court expelled him. 
If Scargill had been an isolated and eccentric miscreant, this might have 
spelled the end ofJohn Spencer's problems. In fact, it was only the beginning. 
As he left Corpus after being expelled, Scargill remarked to a colleague that he 
would be 'revenged of Dr Spencer and his complices', and he then left for 
London to get assistance.30 What happened next indicated that Scargill could 
muster support in high places; two months after he had been expelled, letters 
arrived from the king ordering that Scargill be restored to his fellowship.31 
Scargill had clearly caught on to the recantation idea as a way out of his 
the grounds of'dissolute and improper conduct'. Corpus Christi College Book; Lambeth MS 94I, 
fo. Io8; petition of Corpus Christi College, London, Public Record Office, State Papers Domestic, 
Charles II, 29/266/I43, fo. I. 
30 Lambeth MS 94I, fo. Io8. Scargill was in a difficult situation because the college statutes 
required new fellows to swear an oath on admission acknowledging that 'in case of an ejection for 
any notorious Scandall, it shall not be lawfull for the person soe ejected to endeavour his restitution 
by a Suit commenc't against the Master', ibid. Scargill tried to get around this by persuading his 
father to act as the intermediary, but the college protested that he had perjured his oath. Lambeth 
MS 94I, fo. I07. 
31 Scargill's contacts in this instance are not known. The letters must have originated from the 
office of Arlington, and more specifically from that of his secretary, Joseph Williamson, which was 
a clearing house for this sort of patronage. Twigg suggests that in this instance we can see the 
readiness with which individual petitioners could enlist the crown into their disputes without much 
official scrutiny of their claims. Although this was undoubtedly true in some instances, it was also 
commonly the case that such favours were granted in return for services either rendered or 
promised. It is hard to see what Scargill had to offer in dragging the crown into a protracted 
struggle with its own placemen in the consistory court. It should also be born in mind that another 
client of Arlington at this time was Thomas Hobbes himself. For discussion of the Scargill case in 
the context of crown disputes with the universities, see Axtell, 'Mechanics of opposition', and 
Twigg, The University of Cambridge and the English Revolution, pp. 259-60. 
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difficulties, and the letters suggested that he be allowed to recant again, 'and 
to declare his future adherence to the doctrine and discipline of the Church of 
England'. The letter did not produce instant results. One can appreciate the 
university's (and particularly Spencer's) reluctance to go back on its decision, 
but exactly one month later Gilbert Sheldon, archbishop of Canterbury, wrote 
directly to Spencer to chivvy him along, suggesting that 'you consider well 
whether it be not fit for you to readmitt, without putting the King to the 
trouble of another letter'.32 The archbishop's influence produced a response, 
and Scargill was duly ordered by the consistory court to draw up a suitable 
recantation.33 Although he initially turned up empty-handed, he did eventu- 
ally produce a text which the court amended several times before it was 
officially sanctioned.34 On his way to get the final version approved by the vice- 
chancellor, Scargill bumped into a friend and flippantly referred to the 
recantation as his 'evensong', something which Spencer, reporting the 
incident, felt was 'a speech signifying ... he was not hearty and serious 
therein '.35 
Penitent or not, Scargill delivered his recantation to what must have been a 
packed congregation at Great St Mary's on 25 July I669, and the sermon was 
issued as a pamphlet immediately afterwards.36 The public distribution of the 
text shows that the Recantation had become an opportunity for the consistory 
court to deliver an influential semi-official definition of what they saw as 
unacceptable Hobbism, a move with implications for a much wider audience, 
which it certainly reached.37 Given the various revisions to Scargill's original 
offering, it is no surprise to find that the text has something of a 'scissors and 
paste' quality about it. 
The baroque flourishes of self-condemnation seem to be Scargill's own; he 
summons up the devil as his Hobbesian inspiration, being 'possessed with a 
foolish proud conceit of my own wit, and not having the fear of God before my 
32 Sheldon to Spencer, 28 June I669, Lambeth MS 674, fo. 9. 
3 The court on the hearings of 7, I 4, and 2 I July consisted of Edmund Boldero (Jesus), John 
Pearson (Trinity), Peter Gunning (St John's), James Fleetwood (King's), Joseph Beaumont 
(Peterhouse), Theophilus Dillingham (Clare Hall), Robert Brady (Gonville and Caius) and John 
Spencer (Corpus). Records for Great St Mary's Church, I587-I669, Cambridge University 
Archives CUR I8/6(d-e). 
34 According to the university records of the hearing, the Recantation was checked by Gunning 
after the meeting of I4 July, and again by Dillingham and Pearson after the meeting on 2I July. 
Ibid. 3 Lambeth MS 94I, fo. I07. 
36 The text can be read either in the original Recantation of Daniel Scargill (Cambridge, I669), or 
more accessibly in Linnel, 'Daniel Scargill', pp. 257-60. 
3 The Recantation certainly made a substantial impact in Cambridge, and the pamphlet was 
clearly much-sought-after; John Gibson of StJohn's wrote to a friend the day after the recantation 
that 'the news that fills all mouths here is the recantation of Sir Scargill, which I have sent you in 
print... to read it at large'. 'The letters of John Gibson', Cambridge Antiquarian Proceedings and 
Communications, 8 (i 89 I-2), p. 73. The level of publicity surrounding the case was such that among 
the reasons marshalled by Corpus as to why they could not take Scargill back was that he had 'now 
become so infamous throughout the University if not the whole nation for his pernicious principles 
and debaucheries'. Lambeth MS 94I, fo. I07. 
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eyes', he professed 'that I had gloried to be a Hobbist and an Atheist: and 
vaunting that Hobbs should be maintained by Daniel, that is, by me'. He 
conceded that he had 'lived in great licentiousness; swearing rashly; drinking 
intemperately; boasting myself insolently; corrupting others by my pernicious 
principles and example: To the high dishonour of God; the Reproach of the 
Universitie: the Scandal of Christianitie; and the just offence of mankinde'. 
The recantation includes references to Scargill's role as an agent in spreading 
the 'accursed Atheism of this age ' and also dire warnings to all of his '.victims' 
urging them to 'lean not to their own understanding, but consult the holy 
scriptures... that from thence they may learn to be wise unto sobriety'. 
One gets the sense that much of the sermon was delivered along these 
programmatic lines, but there were passages where the process of revision had 
left room for ambiguity. Recantation was always a flawed punishment for a 
Hobbist, because Hobbes had famously suggested that under the order of the 
civil magistrate it was permissible to give an external profession without 
actually internally subscribing to the views expressed.38 Someone must have 
realized this, and required Scargill to produce the rather bizarre codicil to the 
sermon, in which he brings up this very problem: 
Now lest anyone should mistake or suspect this confession and unfeigned renunciation 
of my sinful and accursed errors, for an act of civil obedience or submission in me, 
performed according to my former principles ... I call the searcher of all hearts to 
witness, that I loath and abhor such practices as the basest and most damnable 
hypocrisy.39 
In fact, the addition fundamentally destabilizes the whole text, leaving its 
sincerity even more doubtful by drawing attention to the fact that recanting 
Hobbists are intrinsically unreliable. In this sense, Scargill may have had the 
last laugh.40 
Perhaps the most interesting and important feature of the sermon is the way 
in which Scargill's Hobbism is defined. The Hobbist charges are listed twice, 
once at the beginning and again towards the end, perhaps for the benefit of the 
hard of understanding. The substantial arguments are first, that all right of 
dominion is founded only in power; secondly, that all moral righteousness is 
founded only in the law of the civil magistrate; thirdly, that the holy scriptures 
are ' made law onely by the civil authority', and fourthly, ' that whatsoever the 
magistrate commands is to be obeyed notwithstanding contrary to divine 
moral laws'.41 Now these positions are adaptations of actual Hobbesian 
38 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, I99I), pp. 343-5. 
3 Scargill, Recantation, pp. 5-6. 
40 The Corpus fellows clearly recognized the disastrous effect of the interpolation, and quoted 
Scargill's own discussion of the problem as a reason why they could not take the Recantation 
seriously. Lambeth MS 94I, fo. I07. 
41 Scargill, Recantation, pp. I, 4. Intriguingly, the first list contains illustrations which bring out 
the darker implications of Scargill's theses. For example, the proposition about all right being 
founded in power is 'clarified' with the proposition that if the devil were omnipotent, then he ought 
to be obeyed. There is no evidence outside the Recantation that Scargill ever subscribed to these lurid 
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arguments.42 What is striking though, is that although these arguments occur 
within a matrix of diabolic inspiration and libertine debauchery, in themselves 
they are remarkably focused upon one particular aspect of Hobbes's work, that 
of the relationship between power and moral authority. As we have seen, 
Scargill had also publicly discussed controversial statements about materialism, 
mechanism, and the universal system, but these very standard topics of 
Hobbesian controversy are not discussed at all in the Recantation, which reduces 
the offending Hobbism to a much narrower definition. When Scargill talks of 
the manner in which his theses are disruptive of the various levels of community, 
such as corporation, college, university, city, and commonwealth, it is clear 
that the point being made is an acutely political one, indicating a position 
which held the sovereignty of the magistrate to be fundamentally determinative 
of natural law and religious worship. What is particularly interesting about this 
is that these arguments were coming to be crucial in a major political debate of 
the period, one that centred around the work of another so-called Hobbist, for 
whom Scargill's definition of Hobbism would become particularly dangerous. 
II 
Samuel Parker, chaplain to Gilbert Sheldon, can only have watched events in 
Cambridge with a certain amount of alarm. There were several ways in which 
Parker and Scargill were similar; even very recent work tends to regard Parker 
as another isolated 'Hobbist'. It is important to note, however, that Parker, 
like Scargill, was the product of a distinctively latitudinarian background, with 
latitudinarian friends and contacts.43 He had undergone conversion from a 
radical puritan sect at Wadham under the guidance ofJohn Wilkins and Ralph 
Bathurst - he had gone on to become the model of a modern rationalist divine, 
an apologist for, and fellow of, the Royal Society. In his Free and impartial censure 
statements. Whether this was an attempt to spell out the implications of Hobbism to a less learned 
audience, or a rather more straightforward attempt to move Scargill further beyond the pale, or 
even both, is not entirely clear. 
42 For Hobbes's original comments, see, respectively, De cive, I.xiv, xv.v; Leviathan, chs. 26, 33, 
36. The first thesis follows the argument in De cive. However, it should be noted that the rhetoric 
throughout Recantation is designed to stress the positivism in Hobbes's arguments. Theses 2 to 4 
imply that Hobbes simply founds moral and divine laws upon the sovereign's will, their content 
being essentially arbitrary. However, the context for Hobbes's discussion is not that 'conventional' 
moral laws have no validity; it is that formal obligation to such moral 'theoremes' is problematic 
- they thus need to be authorized by the sovereign power to provide a clear legal obligation. 
43 Parker is more usually seen as an eccentric high churchman. For this view see J. G. A. 
Pocock, 'Thomas Hobbes, atheist or enthusiast? His place in Restoration debate', History of 
Political Thought, i i (I 990), pp. 737-49. For more sympathetic treatments see Richard Ashcraft, 
Revolutionary politics and Locke's ' Two treatises of government' (Princeton, i986), pp. 4I-54; Gordon 
Schochet, 'Between Lambeth and Leviathan: Samuel Parker on the church of England and 
political order', in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner, eds., Political discourse in early-modern Britain 
(Cambridge, I993), pp. I89-208. 
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of the platonick philosophy of i 666, he had, like John Spencer, joined the call for 
Baconian natural histories, but this was complicated by an endorsement of the 
same mechanical hypothesis which eventually got Scargill into trouble at 
Cambridge. In addition, in the Nature and extent of the divine dominion, he had 
criticized the essentialism which suggested that God's power was restricted by 
his goodness. He had even quoted Hobbes's De cive approvingly and had 
emphasized God's power as the source of dominion.44 This was, of course, 
Scargill's first Hobbesian thesis. These works had already generated critical 
comment for their Hobbesian content, not least from the Presbyterian divine 
Richard Baxter, who had attacked Parker in the appendix to his Reason of the 
Christian relig,ion (1 667). Baxter lumped Parker together withJoseph Glanvill as 
one of the 'younger sort of ingeniose men' whose sceptical outlook and desire 
for novelty had driven them towards perniciously materialistic doctrines. What 
was more, such doctrines concealed an unacceptable moral agenda - as God 
was removed from a world of autonomous secondary causes, moral relativism 
became an increasingly viable hypothesis. Baxter invoked the shadow of 
Hobbes when he wrote that 'if there can be no power ... antecedent to the 
motion, there is but one and the same account to be given of all actions good 
and bad ... then there is no virtue or vice, no place for Laws and moral 
Government'.45 
If this aspect of Parker's writing seems to offer an uncanny parallel with 
Scargill, the archbishop's chaplain was to give his critics even more reason to 
draw the comparison as he entered the heated debate over toleration and 
comprehension in the late i 66os. With the fall of Lord Chancellor Clarendon 
and the rise of an ecclesiastically more open-minded regime from i 667, there 
was much discussion of the possibility of either broadening the Anglican 
settlement to comprehend dissenters within the church, or providing the means 
by which they could be tolerated. For some, though, dissent was still 
inextricably linked to a rejection of the Restoration settlement and a persistence 
of sectarian political disobedience. With calls for liberty of conscience 
interpreted as a threat to the integrity of the political state, Hobbesian 
arguments began to recur in the debate on a scale and with an impact which 
was quite extraordinary. 
Parker's book, the Discourse of ecclesiastical polity, was published in I 669.46 It 
is not clear from the text whether Parker had the Recantation in mind, but in the 
Discourse he found himself defending positions very close to the propositions of 
which Scargill was repenting in July of the same year. The similarity stemmed 
from the use of a characteristic natural law argument against the claims of 
"Samuel Parker, Of the nature and extent of God's dominion (Oxford, I667), p. I 26 (p. 2 in the i666 
edition). Parker maintains that no definition of dominion is 'more accurate and comprehensive 
than Mr Hobs's'. 
4 Richard Baxter, Reasons of the Christian religion (London, I667), p. 520. 
46 The title pages for the first edition of the work bear the date I670, but this must be an error, 
as several replies to the work appeared in I669. 
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dissenters for freedom to worship as they pleased. The major premise was that 
since scripture had not given a sufficiently detailed account of the manner of 
religious worship, one should of necessity appeal to natural law as a guide. 
Natural law effectively delegated to the sovereign power a natural right of 
permission to determine the outward form of worship in things that were 
essentially indifferent, or adiaphora. These should therefore be ordered by the 
sovereign in ways which maintained the civil peace. This argument had been 
used with various degrees of vigour throughout the i66os by latitudinarian 
thinkers, most notably by Edward Stillingfleet, in his Irenicum of i66i, and 
more recently as part of the immensely popular Friendly debate series, dialogues 
written by Simon Patrick beginning in i 668.47 In both instances, the 
maintenance of civil peace had been used to justify the sovereign's right to 
order religious worship. In Patrick's work this argument had come to be used 
more aggressively to attack pro-toleration dissenters, suggesting that their 
attempts to remain divided from the established church constituted wilful 
sedition. 
In the Discourse, Parker's extension of this argument suggested that the 
dissenters' desire for liberty in the external form of worship effectively 
undermined the political order. Rejection of the ecclesiastical settlement and 
the established church was a rejection of the political settlement and a 
statement of political recalcitrance. In saying this, he posited a direct 
connection between good order in the state and uniformity of religion. This 
political interpretation of religious uniformity amplified the role of the state as 
an omnicompetent arbiter in religion and politics. It was necessary, wrote 
Parker, to accept that 'the Supreme Government of every Commonwealth, 
wherever it is lodged, must of necessity be universal, absolute and un- 
controllable, in all affairs whatsoever, that concern the interests of mankind, 
and the Ends of Government'.48 Parker backed this up with a brutal Marsilian 
history lesson, showing that there had never been separate ecclesiastical power 
in the temporal sphere. It was only when the Church of Rome began to usurp 
the natural rights of the civil magistrate that such public and political claims 
were made, claims, according to Parker, which the dissenters were trying to 
revive.49 
47 If Patrick was the S. P. who wrote the Brief account, then this view can be tracked back to that 
pamphlet where it is noted as a distinguishing feature of latitudinarians: 'They espouse settled 
liturgy and saw government as the best way to prevent anarchy in days when every preacher was 
a bishop and every rustick and mechanick took upon them to be a preacher.' S. P., Brief account, 
p. 8. For use of the natural law argument by Patrick in the later i 66os, see Friendly debate (London, 
i668), pp. I04-7, 42 I-2. Richard Ashcraft has also noted some of the more intolerant aspects of 
latitudinarian thought in his article, 'Latitudinarianism and toleration: historical myth versus 
political history', in Kroll, Ashcraft, and Zagorin, eds., Philosophy, science and religion in England, 
pp. I5I-77. For the intellectual background to Restoration persecution, see also Mark Goldie, 
'The theory of religious intolerance in Restoration England', in 0. P. Grell, J. I. Israel, and 
N. Tyacke, eds., From persecution to toleration: the Glorious Revolution and religion in England (Oxford, 
I99I), ch. I3. 48 Parker, Discourse of ecclesiastical polity (London, I670), p. 28. 
49 Ibid., p. 3I. 
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As for his ecclesiology, the minimal prescriptions of scripture and the natural 
right of permission suggested that the lawfully constituted authority in each 
society could adopt church forms which were consistent with an 'honourable 
Opinion of the Deity', virtue, and moral goodness. The general laws of God 
were thus to be circumstanced with the prudence, discretion, laws, and 
prescriptions of the civil magistrate." Parker was effectively making the 
magistrate the interpreter of natural law, and even of the scriptural debates 
which had raged over the form of church government. One does not have to 
look too far to see the relationship with Scargill's Hobbesian theses, which may 
have been composed with precisely these positions in mind. Although Parker's 
sovereign was technically restrained by natural law, how much could that be 
a bridling influence when natural law seemed to be reduced to the justification 
for burgeoning sovereign power? Where, on this account, did the magistrate's 
power end? In yoking public security together with the question of religious 
liberty, Parker was in danger of pushing the prudential powers of the magistrate 
into a pure Hobbesian positivism. 
This can be perceived even more clearly when Parker attempted to defend 
his position over the liberty of conscience issue. Dissenters argued that it was 
fundamentally wrong to force men to act against their conscience. Parker, 
following Stillingfleet and Patrick, argued that this call was mistaken, since 
men have a de facto liberty of conscience anyway; it is physically impossible for 
the magistrate to legislate over the minds of men.51 Parker relies on a sharp 
dichotomy between external actions, which can be policed by the public 
authority, and internal thoughts, which are inviolably private. This was a 
rather extreme application of the institutional scepticism which characterized 
the latitudinarian sceptical and adiaphorist views on church government, but 
it was a view shared by Hobbes in his crucial distinction between reason and 
faith. For Parker to suggest that outward forms were no necessary part of 
religion itself and that one could worship as one pleased in one's own soul, 
without, as he put it, 'upsetting the prince', seemed to many to be taken 
directly from the Hobbesian suggestion in chapter 42 of Leviathan that if the 
magistrate should demand the denial of Christ, then it was legitimate for the 
subject to comply while at the same time maintaining the faith in the internal 
sphere.52 
Parker was clearly aware that he was playing a dangerous game in engaging 
with what seemed like pure Hobbes, and he tried to insulate himself against 
such a reading by providing a detailed refutation of the Hobbesian position. He 
was desperate to reassure his audience that he was not suggesting that the 
magistrate should effectively determine moral and religious truths - this was 
still the province of his law of nature, the magistrate merely prescribed in 
50 Ibid., pp. 82, I04. 
51 Ibid., p. 93. Cf. Stillingfleet, Irenicum (London, I662), p. 72; Patrick, Friendly debate, p. I I3- 
Parker Defence and continuation (London, I67I), pp. I04-7. 
52 Parker, Defence and continuation, pp. 98-9. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 42, p. 343. 
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accordance with it. The Recantation's fourth premise had been that whatsoever 
the magistrate commands is to be obeyed notwithstanding its being contrary to 
divine moral laws. Parker wrote in response to the Hobbesian point that 
where the good or evil of an action is determined by the law of nature, no positive law 
can take off its morality ... and therefore if the supreme magistrate should make a law 
not to believe the Being of God or Providence, the Truth of the Gospel, the Immortality 
of the Soul; that law can no more bind, than if a Prince should command a man to 
murther his father or to ravish his Mother; because the obligatory power of all such 
laws is antecedently rescinded by a stronger and more indispensable obligation. 
Parker's strategy was to find ways in which he could show that natural law was 
in fact an operationally indispensable part of moral and political obligation. 
His argument relied upon drawing the distinction between Hobbes's position, 
in which sovereignty was a product of a state of war, and his own Grotian 
position, in which sovereignty was always a natural correlate of man's innate 
sociability, a sociability which was demanded by natural law.53 Civil power 
was thus employed constructivelyfor society, and in accordance with natural 
law, rather than generated negatively as an artificial source of moral authority, 
as the Recantation theses might suggest. Although in many ways this was 
interesting and innovative work, Parker was left with the problem that his 
sovereignty argument was so strong when dealing with dissent that it seemed to 
swallow up and determine natural law in every case where the public interest 
was held to be at stake. 
The howl of protest was loud and predictable. Dissenters and their supporters 
were quick to identify Parker as a 'Young Leviathan' and his thesis as 
distinctively Hobbesian.54 John Owen, the Independent leader, and the main 
target of the Discourse, replied a few months later in Truth and innocence vindicated, 
attacking Parker's apparent endorsement of Hobbesian hypocrisy over 
religious profession. As for the refutation of Hobbes, Owen commented that 
The hypothesis whose confutation he hath undertaken, as it is in itself false, so it is rather 
suited to promote what he aims at, than what he opposes. And the principles which he 
himself proceedeth on, do seem to border on, if not to be borrowed from his, and those 
which are here confuted.55 
When Parker replied to Owen in his Defence and continuation of the discourse 
(I67I), he remained unrepentent about his thesis, still maintaining that it 
grounded the right of the magistrate in natural law and not arbitrary 
Hobbesian power. What is interesting, though, is that in response to Owen's 
5 Parker's account of natural sociability was indebted to Grotius's Dejure belli ac pacis (i 625), 
and possibly also to Pufendorf's early work, Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis (i 66o). The 
reassertion of Grotian natural sociability became a key feature of the latitudinarian response 
to Hobbes. 
5 For identification of Parker as a Hobbist see Richard Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (London, 
I 696), part II, p. I 23; John Humfrey, A case of conscience (London, I 669), pp. I I, I 2; Henry Stubbe, 
Rosemary and bayes (London, I 672), p. i 8. Anon., Insolence and impudence triumphant (London, I 669), 
sig. A3r. 5 John Owen, Truth and innocence (London, I 669), p. I 03. 
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charge that he was asking men to attend a public conscience and not to their 
own, he wrote that 'this is somewhat rank doctrine, and favours not a little of 
the Leviathan. But yet how can I avoid it? Are these not my own words?... I 
am content to confess that I have said something not unlike them.'56 
Parker's rhetorical question was one which was occurring to many of those 
confronting the problem of dissent, particularly with Scargill's Recantation very 
much in the public gaze, clearly defining those doctrines which had come to be 
central to the debate. Herbert Thorndike amended the manuscript of his 
Discourse of theforbearance (i 670) to include references to the Recantation which 
made the connection with Parker explicit; there are those, he suggests, clearly 
with Parker in mind, 'that are perswaded by the Leviathan, that a church is 
nothing but a Christian Commonwealth. And that the civil power thereof, 
which is Sovereign, hath full Right to injoyn whatsoever it please, for the 
Christian Religion.' Hypocritical subscription to imposed forms of worship, 
however, was as abhorrent to Thorndike as it had been to Owen, and it led 
directly to the very atheism of the Recantation. Thorndike made it clear that 
Hobbes was just one step away: 
As the Propositions first maintained and afterwards recanted by his [Hobbes's] late 
Disciple at Cambridge, do import; 'That there be no difference between good and bad, 
before Civil Power that is sovereign inact it'; then it must be said further, that he is 
properly an atheist. For if God govern not the world, if he reward not the good, if he 
punish not the bad, though men do not... then he is not God. Particularly if Civil Power 
can oblige a man to say or swear, that which he means not, there remains not that 
Ground for Civil Society which the Heathen themselves ... maintained.57 
III 
The Recantation provided a fatal terminus for Parker's position, and the linkage 
had wider implications precisely because Parker was not as isolated a figure as 
has sometimes been suggested. Like Scargill, Parker had pushed beyond 
acceptable limits, but the uncomfortable fact remained that these views had 
emerged from characteristic latitudinarian positions. These were now in- 
extricably tangled in a semi-official definition of Hobbism. It is thus no 
surprise, therefore, to find many latitudinarian thinkers reassessing their own 
theoretical positions in relation to the problem of Hobbism.58 The reopening of 
56 Parker, Defence and continuation, p. 279. 
57 Herbert Thorndike, Discourse (London, I670), pp. II3-I4. The difference between the 
printed version and the manuscript is discussed in Herbert Thorndike, Works (Oxford, I854), V, 
p. 449, note u. I would like to thank Mark Goldie for bringing this reference to my attention. 
58 It is worth pointing out that this problem of political and religious identity affected several 
groups and institutions in the later I66os. Groups and institutions whose nominal identity was 
predicated upon the problematic Restoration settlement (e.g. conformist Anglicans, as opposed to 
Dissenters, both labels concealing a vast diversity of outlook) came under pressure to identify 
themselves in the increasingly murky and turbulent politics of the period after I667. Failure to do 
so allowed opponents to put unfavourable constructions upon ill-defined groups. 'Latitude-men' 
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the discussion about exactly who and what latitudinarians were can be seen in 
the republication in I669 of texts like S. P.'s Brief account, and Nathaniel 
Culverwel's Discourse on the light of nature. Particularly interesting from this point 
of view is Edward Fowler's The principles and practices of certain moderate divines of 
the Church of England abusively called latitudinarian published anonymously in 
I 670. This was written in defence of writers like Patrick and Parker, vindicating 
them from the Hobbesian association. It is not entirely surprising that when 
Fowler itemizes those arguments which mark out the true Hobbist, he quotes 
three of the arguments of Scargill's Recantation verbatim.59 His defence of 
writers like Parker is to suggest that in fact 'these divines have proved better 
than anyone else that Moral Good and Evil are not onely such, because God 
commands the one and forbids the other'. It is clear that Fowler endorsed 
Parker's hard line against toleration, and his work was concerned to elaborate 
upon the anti-Hobbesian position so that he could clarify and develop the 
arguments put so brutally in the Discourse of ecclesiastical polity. This is perhaps 
indicative of the way in which Parker's Hobbism could generate creative 
responses to the Leviathan, and it is worth looking at much of the anti- 
Hobbesian literature of the period in the light of this discussion. 
One example of this is The great law of nature, by one John Shafte, subtitled 
'self-preservation examined, asserted and vindicated from Mr Hobbes his 
opinions', composed in the period I670-I. This conformist work attempted to 
show, in defence of Parker's position, how natural law could indeed generate 
a source of moral authority sufficient to quell the demands for religious liberty. 
Shafte's argument followed Parker in accepting Hobbes's premises but rejecting 
the state of war. Men were naturally sociable, and sovereignty was established 
for the common good. The consequence of this was that, according to natural 
law and the common good, the government must judge 'what liberty may be 
or is consistent with the civil government and not every private person'.60 As a 
consequence, any demand for liberty of conscience in public worship, other 
than what is allowed by the lawful authority, ' is not a thing to be desired' and, 
if implemented, ' it will certainly dissolve and bring to ruine all civil 
are one example, the Royal Society, predicated as it was on a hopelessly eirenic Baconianism, was 
another institution likened to anything from aJesuit beachhead to a puritan conventicle. Anxiety 
about who represented what (including the monarch) was a distinctive feature of a polity which 
was far from accepting the real fissures at its core. 
59 Fowler states that the Hobbesian position is that 'all moral righteousness is founded in the law 
of the Civill Magistrate, that the scriptures are obliging by vertue only of a Civill sanction: that 
whatsoever the magistrates command, their subjects are bound to submit to, notwithstanding 
Divine Moral Laws'. These are theses 2 to 4 in the Recantation. This usage of Scargill's work 
demonstrated the extent to which the Recantation came to dominate the public image of Hobbes 
(whose own works were, of course, in notoriously short supply) in the later I 66os. Fowler, Principles 
andpractices, p. I 2. For use of the Recantation's theses as representations of Hobbes's own thought, see 
the commonplace book entry on 'The principles of Mr Hobbes', in British Library, Sloane MS 
904. 60 John Shafte, The great law of nature (London, I 673), p. I 20. 
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government'. This was, according to Shafte, the greater sin against natural 
law. 
Along the same lines, but at greater length and with more general 
significance, one can see Richard Cumberland's De legibus naturae of I672 
fulfilling the same role in providing a magisterial account of natural law theory 
which emphasized the role of natural law and natural sociability in overcoming 
Hobbes's egoism and moral relativism. Cumberland rejected Hobbes's state of 
war and, like Parker, followed Grotius in emphasizing instead man's natural 
sociability. This natural law of sociability was obligatory because it was 
enforced with natural rewards and punishments, sanctions which could not be 
ignored. Although Cumberland's work was deeply critical of Hobbes, what is 
particularly striking about it is that it maintains many of the premises and some 
of the more politically absolutist elements of Hobbes's position in order to 
vindicate a political thesis supportive of Parker's position.61 The process of 
reconstruction through criticism allowed Cumberland, in re-establishing the 
obligatory force of natural law, actually to use the useful part of Hobbesian 
theory. As he put it, 
And now, when I treat of obligation, which is the Proper Effect of Laws, and becomes 
known to our senses by the Rewards and Punishments consequent upon Observation 
and Violation of those Laws... I may assume what Hobbes has with reason granted, 
provided I take care to avoid the many errors he has intermixed therewith.62 
Cumberland's work became one of the more important contributions to 
seventeenth-century natural jurisprudence, not least for its ability to dom- 
esticate the Leviathan. 
If some latitudinarian writers saw the way out of a Hobbesian dilemma as a 
redefinition of their natural law ideas, for others the problem required a more 
fundamental solution which would take them in new directions. In I 670 John 
Locke made some manuscript comments on Parker's Discourse.63 By the later 
I66os Locke was advising Lord Ashley about theoretical justifications for a 
policy of toleration, but it should be recognized that his earlier work had shared 
with Parker an attachment to the now controversial naturalism. Locke's 
(unpublished) Two tracts on government, written during the early i 66os, had 
opposed toleration using the very arguments which Parker had proposed in the 
Discourse. It was perhaps queasiness about the Hobbesian implications of the 
Tracts which had led Locke to his own discussion of natural law and sociability 
in his (also unpublished) Essays on the law of nature a few years later, in which he 
partially confronted the Hobbesian problem. One senses that his fundamental 
uneasiness was not resolved during the mid- i 66os as he reworked drafts of work 
recommending degrees of toleration, attempting to reconcile viable political 
61 For discussion of Cumberland's place in this debate see Parkin, Science, religion and politics in 
Restoration England, ch. i. 
62 Richard Cumberland, De legibus naturae (London, I672), ch. v, sect. xxxvii. 
63 These comments are in Locke, Political essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge, I997), 
pp. 2I2-I4. 
I04 JON PARKIN 
authority with potentially dangerous religious liberty.64 The Parker incident 
brought these issues into a sharper focus. 
Parker had demanded subordination of religion to the supreme authority. In 
commenting on this argument, Locke asked whether this proved anything 
other than that 'the magistrate's business being only to preserve peace, those 
wrong opinions are to be restrained that have a tendency to disturb it'. This 
was, he conceded, 'by any sober man allowed'. This was the Lockean voice of 
the Two tracts, but the dilemma was that Parker had used the same argument 
to impose external forms of religion, something which Locke could no longer 
endorse, and he laid out the problem in one of his questions: 'The end of 
government being public peace 'tis no question the supreme power must have 
an uncontrollable right to judge and ordain all things that may conduce to it, 
but yet the question will be whether uniformity established by law be... a 
necessary means to it'. It is interesting that throughout his comments Locke 
asks only questions of Parker; providing answers was perhaps more difficult 
because Locke realized that he shared so many of Parker's own assumptions. 
Sharing Parker's assumptions also meant participating in a much more 
questionable tradition, as Locke realized only too well: 'That the magistrate 
should restrain seditious doctrines', he wrote, 'who denies, but because he may, 
then has he power over all other doctrines to forbid or impose? If he has not, 
your argument is short, if he has, how far is this short of Mr Hobbes's 
doctrine?'. 
It could be said that in confronting Parker, Locke was asking questions of his 
own premises, under the recurring shadow of the Hobbesian legacy. Given that 
this confrontation had led him to write creatively before, it was only to be 
expected that in addressing once again the conflict between civil peace and 
personal liberty in the toleration question, he should try and make an attempt 
to provide an altogether new foundation for talking about substantial moral 
ideas and how they were generated. This was a theme which emerged in the 
I 67 I drafts of the Essay concerning human understanding, a work generated, as his 
friend James Tyrrell informs us, in discussions 'about the principles of morality 
and revealed religion', the very topics over which Parker had got into such 
Hobbesian hot water.65 
It is deeply ironic that, in the midst of such intense discussion about what 
Hobbism was, Hobbes himself was unable to participate in the debate over the 
use of his name and ideas. Hobbes had been refused publication in England 
throughout the later part of the decade, which meant that, in what was his 
most productive period, his own positions were largely unavailable.66 It was 
64 See particularly Locke's unpublished Essay on toleration (I667), in Locke, Political essays, 
pp. I 34-59. 
65 R. S. Woolhouse, Locke (Brighton, I983), p. 7; Richard Ashcraft has argued very strongly 
that Locke's Essay should be seen in the context of the Parker controversy; Ashcraft, Revolutionary 
politics and Locke's ' Two treatises of government', pp. io-i i . 
66 For Hobbes's burst of productivity in the later I66os, see Tuck, Philosophy and government, 
PP- 340-5. 
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not for want of trying. Hobbes did actually write in response to the Recantation 
a reply, or protest in the form of a letter for publication.67 According to John 
Aubrey, Hobbes sent the letter to an unnamed colonel, who then passed it on 
to SirJohn Birkenhead for licensing. Birkenhead refused to allow the piece to 
be published. According to Aubrey this was 'to collogue and flatter the 
bishops'. He further refused to return the piece to Hobbes, who had not kept 
a copy himself, 'for which he was sorry', commented Aubrey, because 'he liked 
it well himselfe'. The letter unfortunately does not survive, leaving us with only 
speculation as to its possible contents." Nothing could more clearly indicate 
the extent to which Hobbes's position was being progressively redefined for 
reasons which went far beyond a concern to engage with the philosopher's own 
arguments. 
It is perhaps fitting that one of the most revealing attempts to recycle Hobbes 
creatively should have occurred in the writing of one of those people implicated 
directly in the events leading up to the Recantation, and, with this, we come back 
to Cambridge. The Scargill affair had not been a particularly happy experience 
for Thomas Tenison, his former tutor. Although the college had succeeded in 
excluding Scargill, even after his performance in Great St Mary's the stain on 
the reputations of those who had promoted him in the first place was not easily 
removed.69 In the atmosphere of recrimination which followed Scargill's 
exposure, some were only too willing to make the connection between the over- 
67 For discussion of the missing letter see Hobbes, The correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Noel 
Malcolm (2 vols., Oxford, I 994), p. lvi. See alsoJohn Aubrey's discussion of the affair: Brief lives, 
ed. A. Clark (2 vols., Oxford, I898), I, p. 360. 
68 Since the completion of this article, an interesting new piece of evidence about Hobbes's reply 
has come to light. A letter from Scargill to Tenison, written in December i68o, shows that Scargill 
received a copy of Hobbes's manuscript. In response to a query about its contents, Scargill reported 
that: 'I wish I could retrieve a copy of Mr Hobbes his papers writ agt ye University of Cambridges 
proceedings in my Business. He writt about 3 or 4 sheets of paper, but I remember little of ym but 
yt he pleaded ye University had forfeited her Charter by exceeding her Commission or delegated 
Authority and he made a mighty quoting of his Leviathan in defence of himself yt I remember Sir 
John Birkenhead fell a Swearing This man's starved yt takes his own flesh.' Scargill tried to publish 
the piece himself but could not obtain a licence to do so. When he discovered Scargill's intention, 
Birkenhead confiscated the manuscript. Scargill's account suggests that Hobbes was using the 
incident to discuss several issues close to his heart in the later I 66os. Scargill had been punished for 
holding Hobbesian beliefs by what was in effect an ecclesiastical court. Hobbes, doubtless with an 
eye to his own fate, probably argued that the University had exceeded its authority in punishing 
Scargill. The letter thus developed themes familiar from Hobbes's other writings on heresy from the 
period. The incident also gave him an opportunity to attack the autonomy of the clerically- 
dominated universities, whose reform Hobbes saw as essential in his ongoing struggle against 
priestcraft. For Scargill's letter see British Museum Add MSS 38693 fo. 30. For Hobbes's writings 
on heresy, see Tuck, Philosophy and government, pp. 340-5; P. Milton, 'Hobbes, heresy and Lord 
Arlington', pp. 50 I-46. 
69 The Recantation prompted another petition from Corpus, and further hearings in front of the 
vice-chancellor (for which we unfortunately do not have the records). Scargill eventually left 
Cambridge to be ordained in Norwich in June I672. He subsequently served as rector of 
Mulbarton, an impoverished living near Norwich, later holding the neighbouring parish of 
Swardeston in plurality until his death in I72I, aged seventy-four. For details of Scargill's 
subsequent career, see Linnel, 'Daniel Scargill', pp. 260-3. 
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liberal views of his mentors and Scargill's apostasy. Tenison wrote that he had 
met with some 'who, having heard of the Error, and Recantation, of an 
unhappy young man, committed sometime to my care; began to reproach 
myself as a favourer of such opinions'.70 Tenison set out to confront his own 
private demons by constructing a dialogue, The creed of Mr Hobbes examin'd, 
in which his textural alter-ego, 'a student in divinity', travels to the Peak 
District and comes across Hobbes at an inn in Buxton. The encounter is, 
perhaps surprisingly, good-humoured. The student and Hobbes even go 
bathing together. Thomas de Quincey, recounting the incident in one of his 
essays, was at a loss to explain how Tenison could 'venture to gambol in the 
same water with the Leviathan'.71 Given the context, perhaps 'swimming with 
the Leviathan' was the perfect metaphor for Tenison's recent experiences. It is 
clear that in the book, Tenison is seeking in part to diagnose what had gone 
wrong with his former pupil, and also clear himself from the suspicion of 
Hobbism. In defining Hobbism, Tenison is careful to shift his focus away from 
the controversial political emphases of the Recantation theses: his own alternative 
' Hobbists Creed' refers to those arguments about materialism, liberty, 
necessity, and Hobbes's peculiar scriptural interpretation. These arguments 
marked out Hobbes's heterodoxy in ways which did not overlap with the 
shared political concerns of the latitude-men. There remain, however, the 
points of contact, which give a sense of why Tenison should have wanted to 
define so many of the differences. Both agree that God exists as first cause, but 
Tenison remarks sourly that ' by this argument unwary men may be, perhaps, 
deceived into a good opinion of your philosophy; as if by the aids of it, you were 
no weak defender of natural religion'.72 Equally, they share a similar theology; 
Tenison agrees with Hobbes that God is always in some sense incom- 
prehensible.73 The major difference is that Tenison offers a slightly more 
optimistic account, that divinely ordained natural justice and natural law can 
be perceived in the world with a degree of probable moral certainty, if not the 
cast-iron certainty that Hobbes requires. 
The latitudinarians' problem had hinged around whether this probable 
identification of natural justice could ever co-exist with a Hobbesian account of 
the state when society came under threat from a potential state of war. The 
indication that thinkers like Tenison were going to have to live with Hobbes 
lurking in their theory occurs when Tenison discusses the question of 
sovereignty. In some things, Tenison famously concedes, 'you are just to the 
Prerogative of Kings'.74 Where Tenison felt that Hobbes had gone too far 
was in suggesting that those labelled as tyrants should be considered as 
legitimate as any other monarch. That having been said, Tenison equivocates 
by saying this about the word 'tyrant': 
" Thomas Tenison, The creed of Mr Hobbes examin'd (i 670), sig.A2v. 
71 Thomas de Quincey, On murder considered as one of the fine arts (London, I 980), pp. I6-I9. 
72 Tenison, The creed of Mr Hobbes examin'd, pp. 9-Io. 7 Ibid., pp. 28-9. 
7 Ibid., p. I 65- 
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I know how frequently it is misapply'd by those, who will call the very bridling of their 
licentiousness, hateful tyranny and find fault with the Law for no other reason but 
because it is a restraint upon their supposed freedome; whereas the hedges which the 
law sets down are to keep them in the truest and safest way.75 
The language recalls Parker's complaints about dissenters, as well as Hobbes's 
own protest against misunderstandings of liberty in Leviathan. The passage 
neatly sums up Tenison's own version of the Hobbesian dilemma; the latitude- 
man might not like Hobbes's methods, but he was fatally attracted to his 
conclusion. 
IV 
The dilemma facing latitudinarian writers dramatically illustrates the 
problems confronting writers who wished to combine natural law theory with 
a strong account of political authority. It also allows us to explain why 
Hobbes's works held such a fascination for Restoration audiences. Hobbes's 
most extreme positivism had emerged from the crucible of political and 
religious conflict during the civil wars; the political thought of the Leviathan was 
designed to provide stability through the clear and uncompromising identi- 
fication of the powers necessary to maintain peace. In the Restoration polity, 
the tensions which emerged from the dangerous combination of a broad 
political and a narrow ecclesiastical settlement could sometimes appear to 
threaten an imminent return to a state of war. Under such circumstances, the 
over-arching desire for political stability could make aspects of a Hobbesian 
theory resurface. The continuing controversy about Hobbes's work owed not 
a little to the fact that it kept much of its relevance throughout the period. 
Discussion of Hobbes was a contribution to contemporary political debate. 
But although Hobbes's work still had much of value for a Restoration 
audience, the lessons of the Leviathan needed to be qualified and adapted. 
Hobbes had gone too far in making the state a product of human artifice alone. 
His name became a marker for the legitimate boundaries of political discussion. 
If the latitudinarians needed to borrow the Leviathan's teeth, they had to show 
that the beast itself was the product of nature's (and by implication God's) 
laws. Parker's 'Hobbesian' sovereignty was mobilized in defence of a fragile 
natural society, not, as in Hobbes, as a means for the individual to escape the 
state of war. Learning to theorize about the role of conflict and authority in the 
unstable political environment of Restoration England was always a prob- 
lematic exercise. Under pressure from the dissenters' challenge to the 
church-state, what could be a liberal and reconciliatory line about sociability 
could harden into an argument for positivism and persecution. In facing the 
accusations of Hobbism, writers like Parker, Cumberland, and Tenison were 
trying to find theoretical ways to reconcile their faith in natural law and 
natural sociability with the practical political need for a Hobbesian form of 
sovereignty. It was thus vital that the Leviathan should be discussed and 
75 Ibid. 
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confronted, but even more importantly that it should be tamed, and not killed, 
even if this could sometimes seem like simple borrowing.76 In such ways 
Hobbes's political insights passed into the mainstream, as Restoration political 
thinkers learned to live with the traumatic legacies of the English Revolution.77 
76 As it did to Samuel Butler, satirizing the plagiarist: 'All Plagiarys do but steal, and poch / 
And upon other careless wits encroach / Converst with wits and Rallyers, to way law / And 
intercept, all that they chancd to say. / Made Topiques, Indexes and Concordances / Of smart 
Reflexions, Repartees and Fancies / When that which may be tru enough, turns False / When 'tis 
but weyd in false uneven scales / As he that both condemned and stole from Hobs / like a French 
thief that murthers when he Robs.' Butler, Satires and miscellanies, ed. R. Lamar (Cambridge, I928), 
p. 24I. 
"7 I am planning to develop this thesis in a study of the reception of Hobbes entitled Taming the 
Leviathan. 
